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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
THE AUTHORITY OF PEACE OFFICERS TO CONDUCT
WARRANTLESS CUSTODIAL ARRESTS FOR FINE-ONLY
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
I. FACTS
Gail Atwater and her family were long-time residents of Lago Vista,
Texas, a suburb of Austin.' She was a full-time mother and her husband
was an emergency room physician at a local hospital.2 In March 1997,
Atwater was driving her two young children home from soccer practice in
Lago Vista.3 She was travelling at a rate of fifteen miles per hour through a
residential neighborhood. 4 All three were in the front seat and not wearing
their seatbelts. 5 Officer Turek observed the seatbelt violation 6 and pulled
Atwater over.7 He approached the vehicle and yelled to Atwater, "'we've
met before' and 'you're going to jail."'8 He then called for backup and re-
quested to see Atwater's driver's license and proof of insurance. 9 When
Atwater replied that she did not have the documents because her purse had
been stolen the day before, Officer Turek stated that "he had heard that
story two-hundred times." 10
Because Officer Turek's conduct was frightening her children, Atwater
asked his permission to take them to a friend's house located nearby."l Her
request was denied.12 Officer Turek stated that Atwater's children could
1. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
4. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382.
5. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-24. Atwater claimed that the children were not wearing seatbelts
because they were looking out the window to find a toy that had been lost on the road. Brief for
Petitioner at 2, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408).
6. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324. Section 545.413(a) of the Texas Transportation Code requires
drivers to secure small children riding in the front seat of a car with a seatbelt, if the car is
equipped with a seatbelt. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(a) (West 1999).
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accompany her to the police station. 13 However, one of Atwater's friends
learned of the situation and arrived on the scene to take the children.' 4
Atwater remained calm, did not act suspiciously, and did not pose a
threat to Officer Turek.15 Officer Turek was verbally abusive to Atwater. 16
He stated that he had recently stopped her for the same offense, although
this previous stop did not result in a citation because the children were actu-
ally secured with seatbelts.17 Officer Turek ridiculed Atwater and insinu-
ated that she was a liar because she could not produce her license and proof
of insurance.18 However, if he had followed proper procedures during the
previous stop, he would have known that Atwater was a licensed driver
with insurance. 19
Officer Turek handcuffed Atwater, placed her in the squad car, and
drove her to the police station, where she had to empty her pockets and re-
move her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses. 20 Atwater's "mug shot" was
taken, and she was placed in a jail cell alone for one hour until she was
taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond.21 "Atwater was
charged with driving without her seatbelt fastened, failing to secure her
children in seatbelts, driving without a license, and failing to provide proof
of insurance." 22 She pleaded no contest to the seatbelt offenses and paid a
fifty-dollar fine; the other charges were dropped.23
As a result of the incident with Officer Turek, Atwater's youngest child
required counseling, and Atwater was prescribed medication for night-
mares, insomnia, and depression.24 Atwater and her husband sued Officer
Turek, the City of Lago Vista (City), and Police Chief Frank Miller for
compensatory and punitive damages in Texas state court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.25 The City removed the case to the United States District Court for
13. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1999).
14. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001). Atwater's friend found out
about the incident from a neighborhood child who passed by while it was occurring. Brief for Pe-
titioner at 4, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408).
15. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382. According to the summary judgment record, there was no evi-
dence that Atwater acted inappropriately. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
16. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382. Specifically, Officer Turek stated that Atwater was not taking
care of her children. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
17. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382.
18. Id.
19. Id.




24. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1999).
25. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1999).
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the Western District of Texas. 26 Because Atwater admitted that she vio-
lated the law and because she did not allege that her detention was unlaw-
ful, the district court concluded that her claim was meritless and granted
summary judgment for the City.27 Atwater then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 28
Although the district court dismissed Atwater's action for failure to
state a claim, the Fifth Circuit decided the issue of whether Officer Turek
was entitled to qualified immunity.2 9 The court stated that determining
whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is a two-step process,
which requires the court to determine first, whether a constitutional right
was violated, and second, whether the official's conduct was objectively
reasonable. 30 The Fifth Circuit determined that Officer Turek's actions
were unreasonable and that he was not entitled to qualified immunity. 3'
Therefore, the district court's dismissal of Atwater's Fourth Amendment
claim against Officer Turek and the City was reversed and remanded. 32
The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing of the case en banc.33 In its
analysis, the court stated that the constitutionality of an arrest is determined
by balancing the governmental interests in making the arrest against the in-
trusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.34 The court further
reasoned that when probable cause exists, an arrest is reasonable unless it is
abnormally harmful to an individual's interests. 35 The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that Officer Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and he did
not conduct the arrest in a manner that was damaging to her privacy inter-
ests. 36 Therefore, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment
for the defendants was affirmed.37
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide
"whether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor
criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only
26. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325.
27. Id.
28. Atwater, 165 F.3d at 382.
29. Id. at 384.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 389.
32. Id.
33. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1999). En banc means that all
of the judges were present and participating in the decision. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 546 (7th
ed. 1999).
34. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 244.
35. Id. at 244-45.
36. Id. at 245-46.
37. Id. at 246.
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by a fine." 38 The Court reasoned that the probable cause standard applies to
all arrests, regardless of the circumstances involved.39 The Court held that
Atwater's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 40
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
"[lthe right of the people to be secure in their persons.., against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 41 An arrest made without
a warrant is a seizure, which the Fourth Amendment requires to be reason-
able.42 The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of persons and prop-
erty. 43
In Mayo v. Wilson,44 a 1799 New Hampshire statute allowed "select-
men" and "tithingmen" to stop and detain any person suspected of need-
lessly traveling on Sunday. 45 The plaintiff challenged the statute by arguing
that it violated the state constitution, and therefore, an arrest could not be
justified under it.46 The plaintiff claimed that a warrant issued by a magis-
trate was the only way due process allowed for an arrest to be made.47 In
deciding that a warrantless arrest did not violate the state constitution, the
court looked at the phrase "[n]ullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur
nisi per legem terrae," as stated in the Magna Carta.48
Specifically, it focused on the last portion of the phrase, per legem ter-
rae, which literally means "by due process of law." 49 The court used a rule
of construction, which said: if a word used in a statute has a common law
meaning, then the statute should be interpreted using that meaning. 50 The
court reasoned that a warrantless arrest authorized by statute or common
law had always been allowed by due process of law in England under the
38. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
39. Id. at 354 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
43. Id.
44. 1 N.H. 53 (N.H. 1817).
45. Mayo, 1 N.H. at 54. Selectmen were annually elected municipal officers. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1363 (7th ed. 1999). A tithingman was "[an elected local official having the func-
tion of a peace officer in various American colonies." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2400 (1993).
46. Mayo, I N.H. at 54.
47. Id. at 55.
48. Id. at 55-56.
49. Id. at 56-57.
50. Id. at 55.
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Magna Carta. 51 Based on this historical approval of warrantless arrests, the
court determined that the statute did not violate the New Hampshire Con-
stitution.52 The court further reasoned that the constitution adopted com-
mon law, which allowed warrantless arrests in cases where guilt was obvi-
ous or strongly suggested. 53
In White v. Kent,5 4 the Ohio Supreme Court answered the question of
whether an 1857 ordinance, which allowed a warrantless arrest to be made
when an offense was committed within view of the arresting officer, vio-
lated state policy.55 The plaintiff claimed that state policy permitted war-
rantless arrests only for felonies or breaches of the peace. 56 Section 74 of
the "act to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages"
stated that watchmen could arrest any person who they saw commit an un-
lawful act.57 The court determined that the statute clearly sanctioned war-
rantless arrests. 58 Despite counsel's argument, there was no indication that
the statutes at issue sanctioned warrantless arrests only for felonies and
breaches of the peace. 59 The court determined that many ordinances would
be almost worthless if offenders could not be arrested without a warrant.60
In Davis v. American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals,61 one of the defendants was appointed by the sheriff to enforce an act
meant to prevent cruelty to animals.62 This defendant went onto the plain-
tiffs' property and threatened them with arrest based on his belief that they
had violated the law.63 He also arrested a plaintiff and one of the plaintiffs'
employees. 64 The plaintiffs, whose business was slaughtering hogs, re-
quested an injunction from the court, whereby the defendant would be pre-
vented from impeding their business.65 The statute at issue made it a mis-
demeanor to abuse an animal and allowed the defendant to arrest
51. Id. at 57.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 59-60.
54. 11 Ohio St. 550 (Ohio 1860).
55. White, 11 Ohio St. at 551.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 552-53.
58. Id. at 554.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 75 N.Y. 362 (N.Y. 1878).
62. Davis, 75 N.Y. at 366.
63. Id. at 364-66. The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs slaughtered hogs in a way that
caused unnecessary suffering to the animals. Id. at 365.
64. Id. at 364.
65. Id. at 365. The plaintiffs believed that the defendants would "continually interfere with
and arrest plaintiffs and their employees" unless prevented by the court. Id.
2002]
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violators. 66 It was not necessary for the defendant to obtain a warrant prior
to making an arrest for a misdemeanor violation. 67 In fact, it was deter-
mined that the statute provided the warrant. 68 Therefore, the warrantless
arrest made by the defendant was appropriate.69
Carroll v. United States70 involved the search and seizure of liquor
possessed in violation of the National Prohibition Act.71 Throughout the
opinion, the Court discussed a variety of search and seizure issues, includ-
ing whether a search and seizure could be made without a warrant. 72 The
Court stated the "true rule" of search and seizure as follows:
[I]f the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon prob-
able cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circum-
stances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and de-
struction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amend-
ment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unrea-
sonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens. 73
The strong deference to history and common law reasoning can be seen
in Carroll, in which the Court stated that the rule is sometimes expressed as
follows:
In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer like a private person has
at common law no power of arresting without a warrant except
when a breach of the peace has been committed in his presence or
there is reasonable ground for supposing that a breach of peace is
about to be committed or renewed in his presence. 74
This indicated that the Carroll Court found that a breach of the peace was a
prerequisite for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest.
75
66. Id. at 367.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 369.
70. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
71. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 143. The National Prohibition Act was passed to enforce the Eight-
eenth Amendment, which made it unlawful to "manufacture, sell, or transport" liquor. Id.; see
also National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919) (repealed 1933).
72. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 146.
73. Id. at 149.




In United States v. Watson,76 a statute allowed postal workers to make
a warrantless arrest as long as there was probable cause to believe that a
felony had been or was being committed, even if there was time to obtain a
warrant.77 Although Watson involved the alleged commission of a felony,
the Court also discussed warrantless misdemeanor arrests. 78 The Court rea-
soned that common law allowed a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest
when an unlawful act was committed in the officer's presence. 79 This
common law rule continued to be dominant under state law.80
In New York v. Belton,81 the Court reasoned that certain exigencies may
allow police officers to take action without a warrant.82 In Belton, the Court
specifically stated that it was lawful to search the passenger compartment of
a vehicle when the officer made a lawful arrest of its occupant.8 3 The Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment is meant to control the everyday activi-
ties of officers, and that Fourth Amendment rules should be easily adminis-
trable.84 In order to be easily administrable, the rules should be simple.8 5
The Court deemed it necessary to have recognized standards so that an offi-
cer knows the extent of his authority, and a citizen knows the extent of his
constitutional protection. 86
In Higbee v. City of San Diego,87 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided that a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor was constitutional.8 8 In
Higbee, the plaintiffs were sales clerks at peep show establishments.89 The
plaintiffs violated San Diego Municipal Code section 33.3317, which con-
stituted a misdemeanor.90 Police officers advised counsel for the proprietor
76. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
77. Watson, 423 U.S. at 415. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) allows those who perform duties
related to postal inspection to make warrantless arrests if there are "reasonable grounds" to believe
that a felony has been or is being committed, 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (2001).
78. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 419.
81. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
82. Belton, 453 U.S. at 457.
83. Id. at 460.
84. Id. at 458.
85. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that a "sophisticated set of rules" would likely be un-
workable in the field. Id. (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974)).
86. Id. at 459-60.
87. 911 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990).
88. Higbee, 911 F.2d at 379.
89. Id. The court described peep show establishments as "coin-operated movie arcades." Id.
at 377-78.
90. Id. San Diego Municipal Code section 33.3317(a) stated:
No peep show establishment shall be maintained or operated unless the complete inte-
rior of the arcade where the pictures are viewed is visible upon entrance to such pic-
20021
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of four stores covered under the section that they were going to inspect the
stores and issue field release citations to clerks at stores found violating the
code. 91 The police further explained that if subsequent violations of the
municipal code occurred, the store clerks would be taken to jail instead of
receiving a field release citation. 92 The authority to perform a full custodial
arrest was provided by California Penal Code section 853.6(i)(7).93
When police officers performed their initial inspection, they found the
stores were in violation of section 33.3317 and issued field release citations
to the plaintiffs. 94 Upon a second inspection, the police once again found
the stores were in violation of section 33.3317 and subsequently arrested
the plaintiffs.95 The Ninth Circuit determined that arresting and jailing the
plaintiffs was sanctioned by California law and was consistent with the
United States Constitution. 96 The Higbee court stated that the practice of
allowing officers to conduct warrantless arrests for misdemeanors commit-
ted within their presence "has never been successfully challenged and
stands as the law of the land." 97
In Whren v. United States,98 the Court reaffirmed that temporarily de-
taining an individual is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.99 The appellant in Whren argued that the test for whether a police of-
ficer's conduct in making a traffic stop was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment should be whether a reasonable police officer would have
made the stop for the rationale given.100 The Court stated that previous
cases have always allowed traffic stops to be made based on probable
ture arcade. No partially or fully enclosed booths or partially or fully concealed
booths shall be maintained. It shall be unlawful for any person to operate, manage or
maintain a peep show in violation of this section.
SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 33.3317(a) (1984).
91. Higbee, 911 F.2d at 378. A field release citation allowed arrestees to avoid custodial ar-
rest as long as they agreed to appear in court at a given time. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. "California Penal Code section 853.6(i)(7) provides that a police officer making a
misdemeanor arrest may forego field release procedures if the police officer has a reasonable be-
lief that the offense will 'continue or resume."' Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6(i)(7)
(West Supp. 2002).
94. Higbee, 911 F.2d at 377.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 379.
98. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
99. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10. Thus, the Court determined that an automobile stop must be
reasonable to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Id. An automobile stop is generally deemed reason-
able when an officer had probable cause to believe that the driver committed a traffic violation.
Id.
100. Id. at 810.
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cause, without considering what the officer's subjective intent may have
been. 101
The Court further stated that every Fourth Amendment case involves a
balancing of factors in order to determine reasonableness. 102 The Court in-
ferred that when an officer has probable cause, his actions are almost al-
ways deemed reasonable. 103 When making a traffic stop, the fact that an
officer observed the traffic violation is enough to ensure that he was acting
with probable cause. 104 The Court stated that as long as there is probable
cause, a balancing test is only required when the search or seizure was in
some way extraordinary.105 The Court determined that a traffic stop is rea-
sonable when an officer has probable cause to believe that a driver violated
a traffic law. 106
In Wyoming v. Houghton,107 the issue was whether police could search
a passenger's personal belongings after making a valid traffic stop when
there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contra-
band. 108 The Court reasoned that when deciding whether an officer violated
the Fourth Amendment, it first must determine whether the action would
have been unlawful under the common law. 109 If it cannot be determined
whether the action would have been a violation of common law, then tradi-
tional standards of reasonableness should be considered.110 The Court
stated that reasonableness can be determined by weighing the individual's
privacy interests against the interests of the government in making the ar-
rest. 111
When an officer has deprived an individual of his or her rights, the of-
ficer can be subject to liability.'t 2 This liability, known as 42 U.S.C. §
1983 liability, can occur if an officer acted under color of law while de-
101. Id. at 812.
102. Id. at 817.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 817-18 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
105. Id. at 818. The Court described extraordinary searches and seizures as those where the
conduct is "unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests." Id. The
Court stated that deadly force, entry into a home that was not announced or without a warrant, and
physical intrusion into the body had been considered extraordinary searches. Id. (citing Tennessee
v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927 (1995); and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) as examples of extraordinary
searches).
106. Id. at 818-19.
107. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
108. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 297.
109. Id. at 299.
110. Id. at 299-300.
111. Id. at 300.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1999).
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priving an individual of his or her rights.1 3 Thus, if an officer acted in a
manner that resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right to a citizen,
that officer can be liable to the injured party."l4
III. ANALYSIS
Atwater was a five-to-four decision by the Supreme Court."l5 Justice
Souter wrote the opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.116 The majority held that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors punish-
able only by fines."17 Justice O'Connor wrote the dissenting opinion, and
was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer."l8 Justice O'Connor
found Atwater's arrest unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment. 19
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court began its analysis by stating that the determination of
whether a search and seizure was reasonable should be made by analyzing
what would have been protected at the time the Constitution was framed.120
According to the Court, the Framers' notion of what was constitutionally
reasonable should be a relevant factor, and perhaps even dispositive.' 2'
The Court stated that the first phase in determining the legitimacy of
Atwater's claim was deciding whether common law limited the authority of
peace officers to conduct warrantless misdemeanor arrests to situations that
involved a "breach of the peace."122 Although the Court agreed that the
"breach of the peace" argument had some historical foundation, it was not
concrete enough to withstand judicial examination.123 The Court stated that
Atwater's historical argument was based on the inaccurate notion that the
common law rules regarding warrantless arrests for misdemeanors clearly




115. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 360. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 326.
121. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980)).
122. Id. at 327. Atwater defined "breach of the peace" as "involving or tending toward vio-
lence." Id. (citing to Petitioner's Brief at 13, Atwater (No. 99-1408)).




However, the Court noted that common law principles regarding warran-
tless misdemeanor arrests were conflicting at best.125 In fact, prior to
American independence, Parliament consistently granted warrantless arrest
authority to cover misdemeanor offenses without requiring that there be a
breach of the peace. 126
Next, the Court addressed Atwater's reliance on the quotation from
Lord Halsbury that was cited in Carroll.127 Atwater saw this statement as
conclusively ratifying her position that a breach of the peace was a neces-
sary prerequisite to justify a warrantless misdemeanor arrest. 128 However,
the Court noted that the quote from Carroll was misleading because the
Carroll Court actually dropped the breach of the peace reference when it
stated the "usual rule" as allowing an officer to conduct a warrantless arrest
for a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence.129 By dropping the
breach of the peace reference, the Carroll Court implicitly stated that a
breach of the peace was not required to make a warrantless misdemeanor
arrest. 130
The Court noted that there was not uniformity among authorities as to
whether the right to conduct warrantless arrests extends to misdemean-
ors. 131 It acknowledged that Atwater's contention, that a breach of the
peace was required, was supported by a number of distinguished authori-
ties. 132 However, the Court stated that there was also a significant number
of authorities who contended that the right to conduct warrantless misde-
meanor arrests was not at all constrained by a breach of the peace prerequi-
site. 133 In fact, the Court reasoned that, as far back as 1631, there was a de-
cision that stated "a private person (and thus a fortiori a peace officer)" did
not need a warrant to make an arrest. 134 The Court determined that, con-
125. Id. at 328.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 74.
128. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 328 (2001).
129. Id. at 329; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925) (clarifying
that the common law rule was only sometimes expressed as requiring a breach of the peace).
130. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 329.
131. Id.
132. Id. Some of the authorities mentioned by the Court were Lord Halsbury, who was
quoted in Carroll; James Fitzjames Stephen, author of A History of the Criminal Law of England;
and Glanville Williams, Arrest for Breach of the Peace, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 578, 578 (1954). Id.
Sir Edward East, in Pleas of the Crown, also discussed breach of the peace, however, he referred
only to its "sufficiency," and "not to its necessity." Id. at 329-30 (citing 1 EDWARD EAST, PLEAS
OFTHE CROWN § 71, 303 (1803)).
133. Id. at 330. One of the authorities that contradicted Atwater's position was Sir Matthew
Hale, the Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1671 to 1676. Id.
134. Id. at 331. This reference was made to Holyday v. Oxenbridge, 79 Eng. Rep. 805 (K.B.
1631), a case decided by the Court of King's Bench in 'England, which reasoned that whenever a
2002]
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trary to Atwater's assertion, there was no consensus among scholars as to
what constitutes settled practice in this area of law.135
The Court also determined that Parliament's establishment of "divers
Statutes" exposed another problem with Atwater's historical argument.136
These statutes authorized warrantless arrests without a breach of the peace
prerequisite.137 The Court reasoned that there was no doubt that any deter-
mination of what was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment would have
to be made using the Framers' interpretation of reasonableness, which
would no doubt include English statutes. 138 The Court acknowledged that
there were English statutes authorizing peace officers and private citizens to
make warrantless arrests for nonviolent, minor offenses.139 In fact, the
Court stated that Parliament continually granted the power to make warran-
tless arrests for misdemeanors with no breach of the peace requirement.140
This warrantless arrest power was noted in the sixteenth century,141 the sev-
enteenth century,142 and the eighteenth century.143 The Court determined
that the numerous exceptions to Atwater's contended "common-law rule"
illustrated that there was no clear indication that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment would have found it unconstitutional to conduct a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest for an offense not involving a breach of the peace.144
The Court further reasoned that American legal history also led to the
conclusion that a breach of the peace was not required to justify a warran-
tless misdemeanor arrest. 145 It determined that a reexamination of Ameri-
can jurisprudence led to a conclusion that was contrary to Atwater's histori-
private person was justified in making a warrantless arrest, such an arrest would also be justified
by a police officer. Id. at 331, 332 n.5 (citing 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN § 1,
129 (6th ed. 1787)).
135. Id. at 332.
136. Id. at 333.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. One example provided was the "nightwalker" statutes, which allowed night watch-
men to arrest any stranger walking outside between sunset and sunrise. Id.
140. Id. at 334.
141. Id. In the sixteenth century, a statute allowed peace officers to arrest individuals for
playing illegal games, such as "bowling, tennis, dice, and cards," and also allowed officers to ar-
rest individuals that frequented places where such games were played. Id. at 334-35.
142. Id. at 335. In the seventeenth century, any person could "'seize and detain any ...
hawker, pedlar, petty chapman, or other trading person' found selling without a license." Id.
143. Id. In the eighteenth century, there was statutory authorization for "the warrantless ar-
rest of 'rogues, vagabonds, beggars, and other idle and disorderly persons' (defined broadly to
include jugglers, palm-readers, and unlicensed play-actors), 'horrid' persons who 'profanely swear
or curse,"' individuals who blocked the public streets, and "negligent carriage drivers." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 336.
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cal assertion. 146 Expanding on this historical background, the Court recog-
nized that prior to and during the framing of the Bill of Rights, both the
colonies and the states sanctioned warrantless misdemeanor arrests.147 In
fact, many of the original states allowed peace officers to conduct warran-
tless misdemeanor arrests.148 The Court determined that because the Fourth
Amendment was based on many states' search and seizure provisions, there
was strong evidence that indicated the Framers' intent was to grant equiva-
lent arrest authority to federal law enforcement officers. 149
The Court stated that it was also detrimental to Atwater's argument that
just one year after ratifying the Fourth Amendment, Congress vested federal
marshals with power to enforce federal laws.150 This power was equivalent
to the power that sheriffs and deputies had to enforce the laws of their re-
spective states. 151 Further, the Court determined that historical evidence did
not demonstrate that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment were troubled
by law enforcement officers' ability to conduct warrantless arrests. 152 The
Court stated that the Fourth Amendment could not be interpreted as requir-
ing a breach of the peace in order for a peace officer to conduct a warran-
tless arrest for a misdemeanor violation. 153
The Court also found that there was no indication that a breach of the
peace requirement was instituted after the Constitution was created.154 As
indicated by the Court in Payton v. New York,155 the states were unanimous
in allowing for warrantless misdemeanor arrests without considering
whether a breach of the peace occurred.156 The Court acknowledged that it
has had limited opportunity to analyze warrantless misdemeanor arrest
authority.157 However, in its limited examination of the issue, the Court has
always focused on whether the arresting officer witnessed the offense, not
whether there was a breach of the peace. 158
146. Id.
147. Id. at 337.
148. Id. As support for this proposition, the Court cited the New Hampshire Constitution
and the Pennsylvania Constitution, which served as models for the Fourth Amendment. Id.
149. Id. at 339.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 339-40.
153. Id. at 340.
154. Id.
155. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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The Court cited a number of nineteenth century cases that upheld state
and local laws authorizing warrantless misdemeanor arrests without re-
quiring a breach of the peace.159 For instance, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court upheld a statute that allowed peace officers to stop and detain
any person suspected of traveling without reason on the Lord's day.160 The
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors upheld a statute which allowed a
"justice of the peace" who had "personal knowledge of any person's [sic]
being guilty of drunkenness, profane swearing, cursing or sabbath-
breaking" to arrest that person without a warrant. 161 The Illinois Supreme
Court determined that a Chicago ordinance, which allowed policemen to
make warrantless arrests for unlawful behavior committed in an officer's
presence, was acceptable.162 The Ohio Supreme Court upheld a statute that
permitted the arrest of any person guilty of unlawful behavior committed in
the presence of a peace officer.163 Finally, the New York Court of Appeals
upheld a statute that allowed deputized individuals to arrest people who
violated a statute created to prevent cruelty to animals.164
The Court further based its decision on the legislative custom of al-
lowing warrantless misdemeanor arrests, 165 the judicial custom of sustain-
ing such statutes under constitutional attacks,166 and legal commentary ac-
knowledging the constitutionality of warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors. 167 In fact, the Court found that all fifty states, as well as the
District of Columbia, statutorily permitted misdemeanor arrests by peace
officers without the requirement that a breach of the peace occur. 168 The
Court reasoned that current writings about the topic confirmed that warran-
tless misdemeanor arrests were dominant and had not been successfully
disputed when the misdemeanor was committed within an officer's pres-
ence. 169 The Court determined that contrary to Atwater's contention, there
159. Id. at 342-43.
160. Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 54,60 (N.H. 1817).
161. Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 Conn. 375, 378-79 (Conn. 1931).
162. Main v. McCarty, 15 Ill. 441,442 (Ill. 1854).
163. White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550, 552-53 (Ohio 1860)).
164. Davis v. Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 75 N.Y. 362, 366 (N.Y.
1878).
165. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 343-44 (2001) (quoting FISHER, LAWS OF
ARREST § 59, at 130 (1967), which stated that many states have statutorily authorized warrantless
misdemeanor arrests).
166. Id. at 344 (quoting BEALE, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 21, at 20 n.7 (1899),
which stated that statutes permitting warrantless misdemeanor arrests for offenses committed
within an officer's presence are constitutional).
167. Id. at 343-44. The Court explained that the constitutionality of these statutes was never
based on a breach of the peace prerequisite. Id. at 345.
168. Id. at 344.
169. Id. at 345 (quoting Higbee v. San Diego, 911 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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was never a clear rule requiring a breach of the peace before a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest could be made. 170
The Court next decided whether to grant Atwater's request for a new
constitutional rule.171 The proposed rule was termed by the Court as a
"modem arrest rule," which would prohibit custodial arrests when there is
no possibility of a jail sentence and no compelling need to detain. 72
The Court reasoned that the rule might have been appropriate based on
the facts of Atwater's case. 173 However, it determined that Fourth Amend-
ment inquiry into governmental need should not be determined on a case-
by-case basis.t74 The Court supported this position by stating that police
must apply the Fourth Amendment almost instantaneously in the field.175
The Court ascertained that there is a need for easily administrable rules; and
therefore, clear and simple standards of reasonableness, which will sustain
judicial review after the event, should be established. 176
The Court stated that Atwater's proposed rule initially appeared un-
complicated; however, further investigation revealed that inherent compli-
cations would arise if it was adopted.177 Atwater's proposal included a
system where the line would be drawn between "jailable" and "fine-only"
offenses. 78 The Court determined that problems would arise when apply-
ing this criterion because a street officer may be unable to determine
whether an offense is "jailable" or "fine-only."179 The Court stated that one
reason for the inability to make this determination is because similar of-
fenses lead to different penalties based on facts difficult to know at the time
of an arrest. 180 Some of the specific questions the Court used to illustrate
this were these: "Is this the first offense or is the suspect a repeat offender?
Is the weight of the marijuana a gram above or a gram below the fine-only
170. Id. (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)).
171. Id. at 346.
172. Id. Atwater stated that this "modem arrest rule" would not necessarily require a breach
of the peace. Id.
173. Id. The Court stated that "Atwater's claim to live free of pointless indignity and con-
finement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her case." Id. at 347.
174. Id. A case-by-case determination could have the effect of causing every discretionary
judgment to become "an occasion for constitutional review." Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 347-48.
178. Id. at 348.
179. Id. This is partially because "penalty schemes" are often quite elaborate. Id.
180. Id.
20021
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
line? Where conduct could implicate more than one criminal prohibition,
which one will the district attorney ultimately decide to charge?"181
Atwater's proposed "modem arrest rule" did not end at a determination
of whether an offense was "jailable" or "fine-only."1 82 She said a qualify-
ing provision should be added, which would authorize warrantless arrests
when compelled by the traffic laws or when there was danger to others. 183
The Court determined that this created even more difficulties, including un-
certainty in administration.184 The Court deduced that difficulties would
occur when applying the exceptions to situations like speeding.185 The
Court determined that
there is a world of difference between making that judgment in
choosing between the discretionary leniency of a summons in
place of a clearly lawful arrest, and making the same judgment
when the question is the lawfulness of the warrantless arrest itself.
It is the difference between no basis for legal action challenging
the discretionary judgment, on the one hand, and the prospect of
evidentiary exclusion or (as here) personal § 1983 liability for the
misapplication of a constitutional standard, on the other. 86
The Court determined that the proposed "modern arrest rule" would
cause police great difficulty in the administration of justice and would in-
crease litigation over many arrests.187 This was because the current rule,
which gives an officer discretion in choosing between issuing a summons
and making an arrest, would be modified to a form where the issue would
become whether the warrantless arrest itself was lawful.m88 The Court de-
termined that this clearly conflicted with previous holdings and statutes,
which specifically allowed warrantless arrests to occur based on probable
cause, without requiring exigent circumstances to exist. 189
The Court stated that a "tie-breaker"190 would also not work because it
would, in essence, be a "least-restrictive-alternative limitation,"'91 which
181. Id. at 348-49.




186. Id. at 350.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 350 n.21.
190. Id. at 350. A tie-breaker means that if the police are in doubt as to whether a custodial
arrest is appropriate, they should not arrest. Id.
191. In referring to the least-restrictive-alternative, the Court was discussing the least-
restrictive-means test, a concept that requires a law to be drafted so that it is "only as restrictive as
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would be inappropriate for a Fourth Amendment analysis.192 The Court de-
cided that these least-restrictive-alternative limitations were inappropriate
for a Fourth Amendment analysis because, after the fact, it would almost
always be possible to hypothesize some alternative action that could have
reached governmental objectives.193 The Court reasoned that the costs of a
"tie-breaker" system would outweigh the benefits because an officer, who
was unsure whether an offense was jailable, and thus a violation that justi-
fied custodial arrest, would opt not to arrest. 194 "Multiplied many times
over, the costs to society of such underenforcement could easily outweigh
the costs to defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked."195
The Court stated that, in reality, warrantless misdemeanor arrests
probably were not of such significance that they needed to be addressed
constitutionally. 196 As a basis for this statement, the Court explained that
anyone arrested has the right to a probable cause hearing within forty-eight
hours.197 Further, the Court stated that Atwater was given a probable cause
hearing without delay.198 The Court stated that certain jurisdictions have
actually imposed restrictions on warrantless arrests for minor offenses.199
According to the Court, it is easier to impose such limitations statutorily,
rather than judicially, because legislatures can create statutory limitations if
there is a rational relationship between the statute and what the statute is
meant to control.200 Also, the Court stated that it is in the states' own inter-
ests to impose limitations on warrantless arrests for misdemeanor offenses
because the costs of arresting for "petty-offense[s]" outweigh the bene-
is necessary to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose." Id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
901 (7th ed. 1999).
192. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350 (2001).
193. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 (1989)).
194. Id. at 351-52.
195. Id. at 351. Atwater conceded this point. Id.
196. Id. at 351-52.
197. Id. at 352. The probable cause hearing is guaranteed whether an arrest is for a felony or
a misdemeanor. Id. This is because the government has no interest in detaining individuals who
have been arrested without probable cause. Id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 55 (1991)).
198. Id. Texas law states that persons arrested for traffic offenses are to be taken before a
magistrate immediately. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.002 (West 1999).
199. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001). In support of this proposition,
the Court cited statutes from a number of states. Id.; see also ALA. CODE § 32-1-4 (1999); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 40504 (West 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015(1)-(2) (Michie 1999); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:391 (West 1989); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 26-202(a)(2) (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 32-33-2 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 407-7-118(b)(1) (1997); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-936 (Michie Supp. 2000).
200. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352. The Court could create a limitation only if that limitation
could be subsumed under a broader Constitutional principle. Id.
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fits.201 Perhaps most importantly, the Court reasoned that individuals could
still seek judicial review of an arrest to determine whether it was done in a
manner that was abnormally harmful to their interests.202 Combined, this
led to the Court's determination that warrantless arrests for arguably trivial
misdemeanors rarely occur.203 In the Court's words, there is not an "epi-
demic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests." 204
The Court determined that probable cause is the standard to determine
the appropriateness of an arrest, without requiring individual facts to be
taken into consideration. 205 The Court stated that if an officer has probable
cause to believe that an offense occurred in the officer's presence, the of-
fender could be arrested. 206 The Court determined that the probable cause
requirement ensures that the Fourth Amendment is not violated.207
The Court concluded that Atwater's arrest was constitutional, and that
Officer Turek had probable cause to presume she committed an unlawful
act by failing to wear her seatbelt. 208 In fact, she even admitted to the seat-
belt violation in court.209 Thus, the Court determined that Officer Turek
was authorized to make a full custodial arrest. 210 The Court reasoned that
Officer Turek was not required to determine that a governmental interest
would be furthered before arresting Atwater.2 11
Furthermore, the Court stated that the arrest was not extraordinarily
damaging to Atwater's privacy or physical interests. 212 The Court reasoned
that the determination of whether an arrest was "extraordinary" depends on
201. Id. The amount of officer time and energy that could be put into making arrests for
petty offenses would exceed any sort of societal benefit from those arrests. Id. Thus, state legis-
latures have an interest in limiting the situations in which police officers have custodial arrest
power. Id.
202. Id. at 352-53 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
203. Id. at 353. In fact, during oral arguments, Atwater's attorney offered only one instance
of a "comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor arrest." Id. His example was an instance
where a twelve-year-old girl was arrested for eating french fries in a subway station. Id. at 353
n.23. In that instance, the girl was arrested during a one-week long crackdown devised to enforce
the law against eating on Metro cars and in Metro stations. Petula Dvorak, Metro Snack Patrol
Puts Girl in Cuffs: 12-year-old Eating Fries Among 35 Cited or Arrested in Zero-Tolerance
Crackdown, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 16, 2000, at Al. Because she was a juvenile charged
with a criminal offense, it was statutorily required that she be taken into custody. Id. She was
handcuffed, searched, transported to the detention center, and fingerprinted. Id.
204. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353.










the method by which it was executed. 213 The Court acknowledged that
Atwater's arrest was humiliating, but not more harmful than a typical cus-
todial arrest. 214 The Court determined that "[t]he arrest and booking were
inconvenient and embarrassing to Atwater," but were not violations of the
Fourth Amendment. 215
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
Justice O'Connor authored the dissenting opinion, which Justices Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.216 The dissent began by stating that the
majority's position was "inconsistent with the explicit guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment." 217
According to Justice O'Connor, "[a] full custodial arrest ... is the
quintessential seizure" because it is the seizure of one's person. 218 In addi-
tion, she reasoned that a full custodial arrest made without a warrant must
be reasonable. 219 According to Justice O'Connor, the measure of a Fourth
Amendment analysis should be the reasonableness of the government's ac-
tions under the totality of the circumstances. 220 She determined that com-
mon law has often been used in determining the reasonableness of police
activity.221 When common law is not conclusive, Justice O'Connor stated
that traditional standards of reasonableness must be used. 222 This requires
balancing the individual's privacy interests against the government's inter-
ests.223 Justice O'Connor determined that reasonableness must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.224 According to Justice O'Connor, the ma-
jority's decision, which allowed an officer to conduct a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest, was not supported by precedent or by Fourth Amend-
ment principles. 225
213. Id. at 354.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 355.
216. Id. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,428 (1976)).
219. Id. at 361. Justice O'Connor noted that the reasonableness requirement is stated in the
plain language of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. This common law history is just one consideration when determining the reason-




225. Id. at 362. Justice O'Connor noted that "the majority allow[ed] itself to be swayed" by
the possibility of excessive constitutional review. Id. at 361.
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Contrary to the Court's holding, Justice O'Connor determined that pre-
vious dicta indicated disapproval of warrantless arrests for misdemeanor of-
fenses punishable only fines.226 As support, she stated that, at a minimum,
probable cause must be present in order to make an arrest.227 According to
Justice O'Connor, common law did not provide a consistent rule for war-
rantless misdemeanor arrests, so a balancing test was required. 228 Further-
ing this proposition, Justice O'Connor stated that probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor was a necessary condition,
but not a sufficient condition. 229 An officer must have probable cause to
make a warrantless arrest, but the balancing test should also be required to
determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 230
Justice O'Connor determined that there are crucial differences between
a traffic stop and a full custodial arrest.231 Both are seizures, but according
to Justice O'Connor, a custodial arrest involves a significantly greater inva-
sion into an individual's interests. 232 For example, during a traffic stop, the
driver expects a short delay and a citation, but then expects to be free to
leave.233 Thus, violating a traffic law leads to a limited invasion of the in-
dividual's interests. 234 However, Justice O'Connor stated that probable
cause to believe a fine-only offense was committed does not necessarily
justify invading an individual's interests by making a full custodial arrest.235
She reasoned that "j]ustifying a full arrest with the same quantum of evi-
dence that justifies a traffic stop ... defies any sense of proportionality and
is in serious tension with the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unrea-
sonable seizures." 236
Justice O'Connor explained that an individual's liberty and privacy are
invaded when a full custodial arrest occurs. 237 According to Justice
226. Id. Previous discussions were dicta because the Court has "never considered the precise
question asked here." Id. at 362. The previous cases that have indicated disapproval for warran-
tless misdemeanor arrests punishable only by a fine include Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,
266-67 (1973) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 (1973). Id.
227. Id. For felonies with the potential for imprisonment, probable cause is a sufficient con-
dition to make a warrantless arrest. Id. Thus, a warrantless arrest for a felony has consistently
been permitted. Id.





233. Id. at 363-64.
234. Id. at 364.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. Some invasions that can occur during a full custodial arrest include a search of the
person, confiscation of possessions, and a search of the vehicle. Id.
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O'Connor, this invasion occurs because it may be forty-eight hours before
there is a hearing on probable cause. 238 This detention time may be danger-
ous to those arrested for misdemeanor violations because alleged perpetra-
tors of all offenses may be housed together. 239 Justice O'Connor further
reasoned that the arrest also becomes incorporated into the public record.240
According to Justice O'Connor, the Court previously asserted that a
state's interest in arresting an individual is most clearly determined by the
penalty assigned to the particular offense.241 She further explained that if
an offense's penalty is a fine, there is limited state interest in conducting a
full custodial arrest. 242 Clarifying her position, Justice O'Connor stated that
there may be certain occasions when such an arrest would be deemed ap-
propriate, such as when it was necessary to "abate criminal conduct[, ... to
verify the offender's identity[,] and, if the offender poses a flight risk, to
ensure her appearance at trial." 243 According to Justice O'Connor, absent
these circumstances, a citation serves governmental interests as effectively
as an arrest.244
Justice O'Connor stated that the reasonableness of a full custodial ar-
rest is determined by whether it was necessary to advance governmental
interests.245 A full custodial arrest is not reasonable when the punishment
for the offense can only be a fine. 246 Justice O'Connor determined that a
rule allowing police officers to make an arrest every time a fine-only mis-
demeanor has occurred is contrary to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.247 She determined that instead
when there is probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has
been committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless
the officer is 'able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the additional] intrusion' of a full custodial arrest.2 48
Justice O'Connor explained that the majority used probable cause as a








245. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
246. Id. at 365-66.
247. Id. at 366.
248. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
able cause has never been particularly well-defined.249 Justice O'Connor
stated that probable cause, by definition, requires a case-by-case determina-
tion of reasonableness. 250 She acknowledged that clarity is important, but it
does not trump the Fourth Amendment's requirements. 251
Justice O'Connor stated that the majority's reasons for requiring a
bright-line rule-the potential for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability and the "disin-
centive to arrest ... where. . . arresting would serve an important societal
interest"--could be solved through qualified immunity. 252 She explained
that reasonableness of searches and seizures is different from reasonable-
ness under qualified immunity.25 3 Justice O'Connor further explained that
reasonableness under qualified immunity protects officials from liability
when performing discretionary functions, as long as their conduct did not
violate "statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 254 According to Justice O'Connor, reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment protects an officer from liability when he or
she mistakenly determined that a search or seizure was constitutional, if the
mistake was reasonable. 255
Justice O'Connor asserted that Atwater's arrest was not reasonable. 256
She explained that Officer Turek acted appropriately in making the stop, but
nothing supported his judgment in making the arrest.2 57 According to Jus-
tice O'Connor, "Officer Turek's actions severely infringed Atwater's lib-
erty and privacy." 258 Justice O'Connor asserted that some of his inappro-
priate actions included being "loud and accusatory," frightening her
children, failing to inform Atwater of her Miranda rights immediately after
deciding that he was going to arrest her, and refusing her request to take the
249. Id.
250. Id. Justice O'Connor further stated that her rule would require a legitimate reason for
turning the seizure into a full custodial arrest. Id.
251. Id. For example, the Terry Rule, although arguably imprecise, has proven to be easily
administrable. Id. The Terry Rule allows police officers to briefly detain, question, and search an
individual when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person has committed, or
is about to commit, a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-28.
252. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 366-67 (2001) (citing the majority opin-
ion). Qualified immunity protects government agents from civil liability "so long as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Id. at 367 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 368.
257. Id. According to Justice O'Connor, Officer Turek did not properly balance Atwater's





children to a nearby friend's house.259 Justice O'Connor explained that all
of these actions occurred prior to taking Atwater to jail and booking her.260
According to Justice O'Connor, the City claimed two interests in ar-
resting Atwater even though Officer Turek never stated any reasons for his
actions.2 61 Those interests were "the enforcement of child safety laws and
encouraging [Atwater] to appear for trial."262 Justice O'Connor stated that
neither of these supposed interests was valid because Atwater posed no
danger to the community and she likely would have placed her children in
seatbelts if she had been cited. 263 Justice O'Connor further stated that the
arrest was actually detrimental in regards to child welfare. 264
According to Justice O'Connor, there was no reason to arrest Atwater
to ensure her appearance in court because she was not a flight risk, nor was
she "likely to abscond."265 Justice O'Connor reasoned that when govern-
mental interests in arresting Atwater were balanced with her privacy inter-
ests, it was clear that Officer Turek's actions were excessive. 266
According to Justice O'Connor, the majority's per se rule allowing
warrantless misdemeanor arrests for fine-only offenses has the potential for
serious backlash because a wide spectrum of offenses constitutes fine-only
misdemeanors.2 67 While such laws are a valid exercise of the state's power,
Justice O'Connor stated that the potential for unjust enforcement of them is
troubling.2 68 According to Justice O'Connor, warrantless misdemeanor ar-
rests for fine-only offenses are now completely within the discretion of the
officer, without requiring the officer to articulate his or her reasoning.2 69
Justice O'Connor reasoned that officer discretion has a strong likelihood for
abuse. 270 She explained that the reasonableness of a traffic stop is not de-
termined by a police officer's subjective intent so there must be vigilance in
259. Id.
260. Id. Justice O'Connor found it ironic that Officer Turek did not fasten Atwater's seatbelt
after placing her into the police car. id. at 369.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 369-70.
264. Id. at 370. After witnessing the event, one child had to see a psychologist, and both
children were "terrified at the sight of any police car." Id.
265. Id. She was a sixteen-year resident of the small town of Lago Vista, population 2,486.
Id. Officer Turek knew that she was a local resident. Id. at 371.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 371-72. For example, if an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred, he may make an arrest, search the driver, search the passenger compart-
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requiring an officer's actions to be reasonable. 271 According to Justice
O'Connor, the majority's desire for administrative ease camouflaged
Atwater's arrest with reasonableness. 272
Justice O'Connor determined that a custodial arrest, because it is a sei-
zure, must be reasonable in order to be constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.2 73 In order to determine reasonableness, an individual's right
to privacy must be balanced against legitimate governmental interests.274
Justice O'Connor stated that the majority created a per se rule allowing war-
rantless arrests of individuals who have committed fine-only traffic of-
fenses.275 According to Justice O'Connor, this was contradictory to the




The Supreme Court's decision in Atwater has been cited in several
cases. 277 While the decision may impact federal law, it will have little, if
any effect on North Dakota law.2 78 This is because North Dakota statutory
law grants officers the authority to issue a citation when an individual is
violating the seatbelt laws, but not the authority to make a full custodial ar-
rest in such a situation.279
A. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
In Garrett v. City of Bossier City,280 Garrett was stopped by a police of-
ficer for a seatbelt violation. 281 He was then placed under full custodial ar-
rest for not being in possession of his driver's license. 282 While the offi-
cer's decision to stop Garrett was lawful, it was the subsequent arrest for
271. Id.
272. Id. at 373.
273. Id. at 360.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 371.
276. Id.
277. See generally West v. Commonwealth, 549 S.E.2d 605 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); Garrett v.
City of Bossier City, 792 So. 2d 24 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Hilgeman v. State, 790 So. 2d 485 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); United States v.
Swanson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 992 (C.D. IlI. 2001).
278. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-07-07 (1997) (giving police officers the authority
to stop an individual violating the seatbelt law).
279. Id.
280. 792 So. 2d 24, 25 (La. Ct. App. 2001).




failure to produce a driver's license that was at issue.283 The Louisiana
Court of Appeals stated that Garrett was distinguishable from Atwater.284
The Louisiana statute specifically stated that only a summons could be is-
sued after determining that a driver was not in possession of his license, as
long as the license was not suspended, revoked, or cancelled. 285 This was
different from the statute at issue in Atwater, which gave discretion to the
officer in determining whether to issue a citation in lieu of arrest.286 While
the police officer in Garrett was ultimately found not liable on other
grounds, it was determined that the arrest was statutorily prohibited, and
therefore, the city was liable.287
In Hilgeman v. State,288 Hilgeman was approached by officers while
sitting in a parked taxi because they believed that he was violating the law
by drinking alcohol in public. 289 Hilgeman was subsequently searched and
arrested for possessing cocaine. 290 When the officers approached the vehi-
cle, they had no suspicion of any crime other than the suspected open con-
tainer violation. 291 However, it was ultimately determined that Hilgeman
was not violating the open container law, and as such, the officers had no
basis for arresting him. 292 This was distinguished from Atwater because in
Hilgeman the State admitted that there had been no violation of the open
container ordinance, and thus the State had no statutory authorization to ar-
rest Hilgeman.293 The Florida Appellate Court determined that his convic-
tion for possession of cocaine, which was discovered pursuant to an unlaw-
ful search, should be dismissed. 294
In Caldwell v. State,295 a motorist was stopped for parking in a fire
lane, which was statutorily prohibited.296 The officer who made the stop
admitted that his decision was partially based on his recognition of
283. Id. at 26.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 27; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:411.1(C)(1) (2001).
286. Garrett, 792 So. 2d at 26.
287. Id. at 28. The officer was deemed unaccountable because the arrest was made based on
a "de facto departmental policy" stating that individuals who were unable to produce a license
should always be jailed. Id. This policy was initiated based on a judge's recommendation. Id.
288. 790 So. 2d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
289. Hilgeman, 790 So. 2d at 486.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 487.
293. Id. at 487 n.2.
294. Id. at 487.
295. 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).
296. Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1042.
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Caldwell as a person involved in drug dealing. 297 Drugs and drug para-
phernalia were ultimately discovered in the car.298 Caldwell was convicted
of a variety of drug-related offenses. 299 He appealed the lower court's deci-
sion on six different grounds.3 00 One of Caldwell's contentions on appeal
was that even though the initial stop may have been valid, "the officer's
conduct during the stop was not reasonably related to the justification for
the traffic stop and therefore violated his constitutional rights."
301
The Delaware Supreme Court determined that the traffic stop, which
included a pat down search and the use of handcuffs, was not justifiably
related to the stop for the parking violation, and therefore, the officer's con-
duct was not justified.302 The court reasoned that the officer had authority
to make a warrantless arrest for the traffic violation, but the officer could
only arrest the individual for an unrelated criminal offense if the officer had
probable cause. 303 Thus, the court determined it was error to deny
Caldwell's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the un-
lawful arrest.
304
B. APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA LAW
It remains to be seen exactly how Atwater will affect the jurisprudence
of North Dakota courts. The North Dakota Century Code does provide
authority for warrantless misdemeanor arrests. 305 North Dakota Century
Code section 29-06-15 lists eight situations in which a peace officer may
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1043. Drugs were also found at Caldwell's residence due to information provided
by the passenger in Caldwell's vehicle at the time of the stop. Id. at 1043-44.
299. Id. at 1044.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1049.
303. Id. at 1051 n.33.
304. Id. at 1059-60.
305. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15 (Supp. 2001) (listing when warrantless arrests may oc-
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arrest without a warrant. 306 However, none of these situations involves
seatbelt violations. 307
North Dakota law requires the use of seatbelts in vehicles designed for
fewer than eleven passengers if the vehicle was originally manufactured
with seatbelts. 308 However, the statutory duty of a police officer when
making a stop based on a violation of a traffic regulation provides the citi-
zen with more protection than that allowed in Atwater.309 According to
North Dakota statutory law, when a person is stopped because of a seatbelt
violation, the officer is allowed to take the name and address of the individ-
ual, take the license plate number of the vehicle, and issue a summons or
notify the person in writing of his right to request a hearing. 310 The officer
is not allowed to make a custodial arrest or require the individual to go with
the officer to a different location if the traffic violation was considered non-
criminal under North Dakota Century Code section 39-06.1-02.311 Thus,
North Dakota police officers may not conduct full custodial arrests for seat-
belt violations. 312
V. CONCLUSION
The issue in Atwater was a question of first impression for the Supreme
Court of the United States.313 In making its decision, the Court thoroughly
analyzed the history of warrantless misdemeanor arrest jurisprudence. 314 It
306. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15(1)(a)-(h). According to the relevant provisions, an offi-
cer may make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest for committing or attempting a public offense in
the officer's presence, committing felonies, committing a public offense not considered a felony
and not committed in the officer's presence, driving or being in actual physical control of a vehi-
cle while under the influence of alcohol, violating a protective order, engaging in domestic vio-
lence, or being under the influence of volatile chemical vapors. Id. North Dakota also statutorily
provides for instances when an individual may not be entitled to release based on officer discre-
tion. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-07-09 (Supp. 2001). However, this provision involves situations in
which the individual has engaged in a second offense in addition to the seatbelt violation. See id.
307. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15(l)(a)-(h).
308. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4 (1997). However, a police officer can only issue a ci-
tation for a seatbelt violation if that officer has stopped the driver for a different violation. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.5 (1997). Thus, seatbelt violations can only be secondarily enforced;
they cannot be the source of the initial stop. Id.
309. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-07-07 (1997); see generally Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318 (2001).
310. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-07-07.
311. Id. Any person charged under section 39-07-07 is charged with a noncriminal offense.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-02 (1997).
312. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-07-07.
313. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 362.
314. See generally iid.
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ultimately determined that making warrantless misdemeanor arrests for
fine-only offenses, such as traffic stops, is constitutional. 315
Kristi Schatz
315. Id. at 354.
[VOL. 78:381
